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Interpretation, Truth, and the Logical Forms of Interpretive Discourse

  • Pierluigi Chiassoni
Chapter
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 128)

Abstract

What is legal interpretation? Which relations, if any, do exist between legal interpretation and truth? Which are the logical forms of the sentences we find in interpretive discourse? By providing an answer to these questions, the chapter purports to set the stage for the whole book. In carrying out an enquiry concerning the connections between legal interpretation and truth, it outlines a realistic conceptual apparatus, which aims at capturing (most of) the relevant features in the phenomenon of “legal interpretation” very broadly conceived. It also lays down a proposal concerning the logical forms of the basic varieties of sentences occurring in interpretive discourse.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierluigi Chiassoni
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di GiurisprudenzaUniversità di GenovaGenovaItaly

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