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Deniable Secret Handshake Protocol - Revisited

  • Somnath PanjaEmail author
  • Sabyasachi Dutta
  • Kouichi Sakurai
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 926)

Abstract

The notion of deniability ensures that the transcript generated in an interactive protocol does not yield any evidence of the interaction. In the context of key-exchange protocols for secure message transmission, the notion of deniability is well-explored. On the other hand, a secret handshake protocol enables a group of authorized users to establish a shared secret key and authenticate each other. Recently, a framework for deniable secret handshake is proposed by Tian et al. in ISPEC 2018. We analyze the protocol, show three flaws and give solutions to prevent them.

Keywords

Secret handshake Key exchange Deniability Public random oracle 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The first author is financially supported by Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India under a research fellowship program. The work presented in this paper was carried out while the first author visited Kyushu University, Japan. The second author is financially supported by the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Japan under an International Exchange Program. The third author is partially supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research KAKENHI (C) JP18K11297.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Somnath Panja
    • 1
    Email author
  • Sabyasachi Dutta
    • 2
  • Kouichi Sakurai
    • 2
  1. 1.Applied Statistics UnitIndian Statistical InstituteKolkataIndia
  2. 2.Faculty of Information Science and Electrical EngineeringKyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan

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