Affective Decision-Making in Ultimatum Game: Responder Case
The paper focuses on prescriptive affective decision making in Ultimatum Game (UG). It describes preliminary results on incorporating emotional aspects into normative decision making. One of the players (responder) is modelled via Markov decision process. The responder’s reward function is the weighted combination of two components: economic and emotional. The first component represents pure monetary profit while the second one reflects overall emotional state of the responder. The proposed model is tested on simulated data.
KeywordsDecision making Emotions in economic game Markov decision process Ultimatum Game
We would like to thank Eliška Zugarová for comments that greatly influenced the manuscript. The authors express their gratitude to anonymous reviewers for the valuable suggestions.
- 1.MATLAB version 7.5.0 (R2007b): The MathWorks Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, USA (2010)Google Scholar
- 2.Binmore, K.G.: Game Theory and the Social Contract: Just Playing, vol. 2. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1998)Google Scholar
- 11.Loewenstein, G., Lerner, J.S.: The role of affect in decision making. In: Handbook of Affective Sciences, pp. 619–642. Oxford University Press (2003). (Chap. 31)Google Scholar
- 14.Rabin, M.: Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. Am. Econ. Rev. 83(5), 1281–1302 (1993)Google Scholar