The Evolution and Persistence of NATO
NATO’s participation in the four conflicts analyzed in the preceding chapters revealed the major strengths and weaknesses of the alliance in combat, as well as the advantages to the United States’ efforts to engage NATO. Despite an almost across-the-board reduction in domestic resources, the allies undertook several new initiatives in the inter-conflict periods to improve the alliance’s political and military infrastructure. Some of these efforts to streamline NATO resources reflected the defense budget cuts of many of the European allies and changing domestic and international priorities. Other changes resulted from the recognition of a new security environment and the need for a modernization of capabilities. NATO’s reforms of existing programs, establishment of new initiatives, expanding membership and non-NATO state partnerships, and summit declarations further reflected the alliance’s attempts to evolve and persist in the post-Cold War environment. This chapter analyzes the ways in which the alliance responded to these watershed moments in the inter-conflict periods. In addition to exercising a substantial influence during the four conflicts, the United States significantly impacted the inter-conflict development of the alliance. This allows for a more complete understanding of NATO’s evolution and fills important gaps in the existing perspectives on alliance persistence.
- Barbero, Michael (USA-Ret., Former Commander NTM-I). Interview with Author, Jan 15, 2015.Google Scholar
- Barry, Charles. 2012. Building Future Transatlantic Interoperability Around a Robust NATO Response Force. Transatlantic Current 7: 1–14.Google Scholar
- Douglas, Frank. 2007. The United States, NATO, and a New Multilateral Relationship. Westport, PSI Reports.Google Scholar
- Gaub, Florence. 2013. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Press.Google Scholar
- Graham, Bradley, and Robert G. Kaiser. 2002. On Iraq Action, US Is Keeping NATO Sidelined. The Washington Post, September 24.Google Scholar
- Ham, Carter (USA-Ret., Commander, USAFRICOM). Interview with Author. Carter Ham, Jan 19, 2015.Google Scholar
- Johnston, Seth Allen. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
- Lambeth, Benjamin S. 2001. NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment. Santa Monica: Rand.Google Scholar
- Martin, Matthew J. 2014. Unifying Our Vision: Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Joint ISR Initiative. Washington, DC: National Defense University.Google Scholar
- Miles, Donna. 2004. NATO Response Force Ready for Duty, Rumsfeld Says. June 27. http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=26194. Accessed 6 Apr 2015.
- Nardulli, Bruce R., Walter L. Perry, Bruce R. Pirnie, John Gordon IV, and John G. McGinn. 2002. Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999. Santa Monica: Rand.Google Scholar
- NATO. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept. Last Modified Apr 24, 1999a. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. Accessed 6 Feb 2014.
- ———. Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). Last Modified Dec 2, 1999b. www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9912-hq/fs-dci99.htm. Accessed 11 Nov 2014.
- ———. Prague Summit Declaration. Last Modified Nov 21, 2002. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19552.htm?selectedLocale=eng. Accessed 3 Feb 2014.
- ———. Riga Summit Declaration. Last Modified Nov 29, 2006. https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm. Accessed 9 Apr 2015.
- ———. Bucharest Summit Declaration. Last Modified Apr 3, 2008. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm. Accessed 9 Apr 2015.
- ———. Strasbourg/Kehl Declaration. Last Modified Apr 4, 2009. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm
- ———. Lisbon Summit Declaration. Last Modified Nov 20, 2010a. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm. Accessed 9 Apr 2015.
- ———. Strategic Concept 2010. Last Modified Nov 19, 2010b. http://www.nato.int/cps/nl/natohq/topics_82705.htm. Accessed 9 Apr 2015.
- ———. NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism: Executive Summary. Last Modified Apr 15, 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_72737.htm. Accessed 9 Apr 2015.
- ———. Chicago Summit Declaration. Last Modified May 20, 2012. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm. Accessed 9 Apr 2015.
- ———. Countering Terrorism. Last Modified Apr 8, 2015a. http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm? Accessed 9 Apr 2015.
- ———. NATO Assistance to Iraq. Last Modified Sept 1, 2015b. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51978.htm
- ———. The Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism. Last Modified Mar 11, 2015c. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50084.htm. Accessed 9 Apr 2015.
- ———. Smart Defence. Last Modified Feb 4, 2015d. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm? Accessed 21 Mar 2015.
- ———. 2017. The Secretary General’s Annual Report. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_03/20180315_SG_AnnualReport_en.pdf
- ———. NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre – NIFC History. http://web.ifc.bices.org/about.htm. Accessed 15 Mar 2015.
- ———. NATO Response Force. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm. Accessed 24 July 2014.
- Rasmussen, Anders F. Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Bucharest, Romania. Last Modified Oct 10, 2011. www.nato.int/cps/en.natolive/opinions_79064. Accessed 6 Mar 2015.
- Stavridis, James (USN-Ret., Former Commander, USEUCOM, NATO SACEUR). Interview with Author, 2015.Google Scholar
- U.S. Department of Defense. U.S. Will Propose a New, Agile Military Response Force for NATO. Last Modified Sept 24, 2002. http://email@example.com#axzz3EozjCWk2. Accessed 14 July 2014.
- Weitsman, Patricia. 2014. Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
- Woodward, Margaret H., and Philip G. Morrison. 2013. The Responsibility to Protect: The Libya Test Case. Joint Forces Quarterly 71: 20–24.Google Scholar