EPIC: An Electric Power Testbed for Research and Training in Cyber Physical Systems Security

  • Sridhar AdepuEmail author
  • Nandha Kumar Kandasamy
  • Aditya Mathur
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11387)


Testbeds that realistically mimic the operation of critical infrastructure are of significant value to researchers. One such testbed, named Electrical Power and Intelligent Control (EPIC), is described in this paper together with examples of its use for research in the design of secure smart-grids. EPIC includes generation, transmission, smart home, and micro-grid. EPIC enables researchers to conduct research in an active and realistic environment. It can also be used to understand the cascading effects of failures in one Industrial Control System (ICS) on another, and to assess the effectiveness of novel attack detection algorithms. Four feasible attack scenarios on EPIC are described. Two of these scenarios, demonstrated on EPIC, namely a power supply interruption attack and a physical damage attack, and possible mitigation, are also described.


Critical infrastructure Cyber Physical Systems Smart-grid testbed Smart-grid security Cyber attacks 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sridhar Adepu
    • 1
    Email author
  • Nandha Kumar Kandasamy
    • 1
  • Aditya Mathur
    • 1
  1. 1.iTrust, Center for Research in Cyber SecuritySingapore University of Technology and DesignSingaporeSingapore

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