20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
20 voting procedures for electing a single candidate are introduced and briefly commented upon. The procedures fall into three classes in terms of the type of voter input and Condorcet consistency: non-ranked procedures, ranked procedures that are not Condorcet-consistent and ranked ones that are Condorcet-consistent. The first class consists of four procedures, the second consists of seven procedures and the third class consists of nine procedures.
KeywordsNon-ranked voting procedures Ranked procedures Condorcet-consistent procedures
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