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Propositionalism and the Law

  • Izabela Skoczeń
Chapter
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 127)

Abstract

In this chapter, I question the Gricean notion of ‘what is said’. I give an outline of arguments supporting the thesis that there are more pragmatic elements of the ‘what is said’ notion than just disambiguation and reference assignments. These additional elements are referred to as ‘pragmatic enrichments’ by neo-Griceans and are distinguished by them from conversational implicatures. I argue that such pragmatic enrichments are subject to the same strategic framework as strong pragmatic effects such as conversational implicatures.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Izabela Skoczeń
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Legal Theory and Jagiellonian Centre for Law, Language and PhilosophyJagiellonian UniversityKrakówPoland

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