• Izabela Skoczeń
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 127)


In the present chapter I outline the general structure of this book as well as the theoretical and philosophical backbone of the study of legal language in context. First, I proceed with an outline of Herbert Hart’s and Ronald Dworkin’s views on whether the linguistic exchange between legislatures and courts can be considered a form of communication. Second, I provide an overview of the history of the field of linguistic pragmatics, a field that sets ground for the analysis performed in the present book. Third, I discuss current interdisciplinary approaches to philosophy of language, law and mind. I conclude that although approaches to language which aim to discover the functioning of the brain are slowly coming to dominate scientific inquiry, there still remains a place for pragmatic-style analysis in fields such as the legal communicative realm.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Izabela Skoczeń
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Legal Theory and Jagiellonian Centre for Law, Language and PhilosophyJagiellonian UniversityKrakówPoland

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