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In Militias We Trust: Civilian Victims of Targeted Killings by Pro-government Armed Groups in Afghanistan

  • Vasja Badalič
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Victims and Victimology book series (PSVV)

Abstract

This chapter examines the targeted killings of civilians by pro-government armed groups in Afghanistan. The first two sections explore the too-broad criteria used by pro-government militias for determining legitimate military targets. The targets included civilians perceived to be linked to the insurgency (e.g., family members and relatives of alleged insurgents, civilians suspected of providing assistance to alleged insurgents) and civilians who, despite not being linked to the insurgency, refused to submit themselves to the authority of the militias (e.g., political and religious figures objecting the militias’ activities, civilians refusing to pay illegal taxation imposed by the militias). The third section explores how the criteria for determining targets of killings ignored the standard definitions of legitimate military targets in non-international armed conflicts.

Keywords

Afghanistan U.S. military CIA Pro-government armed groups Militias Targeted killings The principle of distinction 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vasja Badalič
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Criminology at the Faculty of LawLjubljanaSlovenia

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