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Demystifying Roman Ingarden’s Purely Intentional Objects of Perception

  • Genki Uemura
Chapter
Part of the Contributions To Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 101)

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to eliminate a seeming redundancy in Roman Ingarden’s theory of perceptual intentionality and, through this, provide a modest and partial defense of his theory. I shall first argue that, contrary to an impression one might initially have, Ingarden’s notion of purely intentional objects of perception is not superfluous; purely intentional objects of perception play a role as representational contents. Second, I shall point out that Ingarden’s theory has some merits that prove it to be worthy of serious and closer consideration for us today.

Keywords

Ingarden Perceptual experience Intentionality Intentional objects Representational contents 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Genki Uemura
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of Humanities and Social SciencesOkayama UniversityOkayamaJapan

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