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Static Traffic Assignment on Ensembles of Synthetic Road Networks

  • Alonso Espinosa Mireles de VillafrancaEmail author
  • Richard D. Connors
  • R. Eddie Wilson
Conference paper

Abstract

We present a systematic approach for studying how performance of road networks is affected by changes in their geometry. We develop a new family of random planar graphs that models road networks and interpolates between a square grid and the β-skeleton of uniformly random points. The capacities of streets are set according to a rule that models a fixed provision of total resources. Ensembles of graphs are generated for different geometric parameter choices and the static traffic assignment problem is solved for a range of traffic demands. We find that variations in network efficiency, measured by the price of anarchy, are small both across demand values and geometric parameters. However, the best-performing networks are those which preserve some grid structure. We find that the price of anarchy does not correlate well with standard network statistics.

Notes

Acknowledgement

The first author would like to acknowledge funding from the Mexican Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alonso Espinosa Mireles de Villafranca
    • 1
    Email author
  • Richard D. Connors
    • 2
  • R. Eddie Wilson
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BristolBristolUK
  2. 2.University of LeedsLeedsUK

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