Board Interlocking and IT Governance: Proposed Conceptual Model

  • Allam HamdanEmail author
  • Abdalmuttaleb Musleh Al-Sartawi
  • Reem Khamis
  • Mohammed Anaswah
  • Ahlam Hassan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing book series (LNBIP, volume 341)


This paper seeks to present a new dimension to the dimensions of IT governance; it proposes a model for the board interlocking and the IT governance. This conceptual model is based primarily on the Resource Dependence theory and tries to interpret the relationship between the board interlocking and the IT governance. This paper has theoretically reviewed the existing literature of the board interlocking; it has also added to the real gap in the literature of corporate governance which has not explained the importance of the board interlocking with IT governance. The researchers hope to provides a solid foundation for IT governance in order to supply companies with information about the IT environment surrounding it, the operating procedures, and the effective monitoring of the information systems, the challenges they face, the opportunities they may have, and to provide members of the board of directors with neutral opinion about these opportunities and challenges. The paper presents several contributions at both theoretical and practical levels; it paves the way for researchers to discuss the board interlocking with IT governance which contributes to the development of the theories governing the work of these concepts. It also draws the attention of the companies’ administration to one of the most important practices in forming and structuring the board, i.e. the necessity of connecting the board of directors with managers who are qualified with practical experience in information systems.


Board interlocking IT governance Board of director’s Board independence 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Allam Hamdan
    • 1
    Email author
  • Abdalmuttaleb Musleh Al-Sartawi
    • 1
  • Reem Khamis
    • 2
  • Mohammed Anaswah
    • 3
  • Ahlam Hassan
    • 1
  1. 1.Ahlia UniversityManamaBahrain
  2. 2.Brunel UniversityLondonUK
  3. 3.Mutah UniversityMaanJordan

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