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Conclusions

  • Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito
Chapter

Abstract

This Chapter presents conclusions, deriving from analysis of the US regulatory process of private security contractors through conceptual framework of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice. In addition to identifying obstacles of the regulatory process of PSCs in the USA, it summarizes how it is theoretically possible to observe it in this and other cases by applying Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice. It exposes the utility of such an approach for other research and demonstrates possibilities for further research.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of History and International RelationsUniversity of PortoPortoPortugal

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