Political, Bureaucratic, and Organizational Obstacles in Regulation of the PSCs

  • Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito


This chapter takes on the deconstructed identities and continues deconstructing the political process of regulation first and then the bureaucratic process. It explores the political factor, seen in ideological battles within Congress and departmental competition. It demonstrates that both agents and structure cause obstacles in the regulatory process and analyzes issues as bureaucratic struggles, institutional memory loss, revolving doors, urgency caused by media pressure, organizational obstacles, and influence of personality and personal connections on regulatory process. By discussing practices, the chapter demonstrates where those obstacles are visible and introduces the conditions that gave rise to the regulatory process.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of History and International RelationsUniversity of PortoPortoPortugal

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