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Assessing the Feasibility of Single Trace Power Analysis of Frodo

  • Joppe W. BosEmail author
  • Simon Friedberger
  • Marco Martinoli
  • Elisabeth Oswald
  • Martijn Stam
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11349)

Abstract

Lattice-based schemes are among the most promising post-quantum schemes, yet the effect of both parameter and implementation choices on their side-channel resilience is still poorly understood. Aysu et al. (HOST’18) recently investigated single-trace attacks against the core lattice operation, namely multiplication between a public matrix and a “small” secret vector, in the context of a hardware implementation. We complement this work by considering single-trace attacks against software implementations of “ring-less” LWE-based constructions.

Specifically, we target Frodo, one of the submissions to the standardisation process of NIST, when implemented on an (emulated) ARM Cortex M0 processor. We confirm Aysu et al.’s observation that a standard divide-and-conquer attack is insufficient and instead we resort to a sequential, extend-and-prune approach. In contrast to Aysu et al. we find that, in our setting where the power model is far from being as clear as theirs, both profiling and less aggressive pruning are needed to obtain reasonable key recovery rates for SNRs of practical relevance. Our work drives home the message that parameter selection for LWE schemes is a double-edged sword: the schemes that are deemed most secure against (black-box) lattice attacks can provide the least security when considering side-channels. Finally, we suggest some easy countermeasures that thwart standard extend-and-prune attacks.

Keywords

Side-channel analysis LWE Frodo Template attacks Lattices 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Open image in new window The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme Marie Skłodowska-Curie ITN ECRYPT-NET (Project Reference 643161) and Horizon 2020 project PQCRYPTO (Project Reference 645622). Furthermore, Elisabeth Oswald was partially funded by H2020 grant SEAL (Project Reference 725042). We thank the authors of ELMO for their kind help, comments and feedback.

Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joppe W. Bos
    • 1
    Email author
  • Simon Friedberger
    • 1
    • 2
  • Marco Martinoli
    • 3
  • Elisabeth Oswald
    • 3
  • Martijn Stam
    • 3
  1. 1.NXP SemiconductorsEindhovenNetherlands
  2. 2.KU Leuven - iMinds - COSICLeuvenBelgium
  3. 3.University of BristolBristolUK

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