Media Delivery Competition with Edge Cloud, Remote Cloud and Networking

  • Xinyi HuEmail author
  • George Kesidis
  • Behdad Heidarpour
  • Zbigniew Dziong
Conference paper
Part of the Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications book series (SDGTFA)


We describe a marketplace for content distribution, specifically stored-video streaming, involving both edge cloud (fog) and remote cloud computing and storage resources. Three different types of participants are considered: providers that are affiliated with the remote cloud, those that are affiliated with the ISP/edge, and those affiliated with neither. For a simple model, we explore the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we formulate a leader-follower game involving a market regulator maximizing a social welfare and study its Stackelberg equilibrium. For a market regulator seeking to limit prices charged by an edge-cloud entrant, we show an interesting trade-off between “moderate” edge-cloud prices and existence of follower (Nash) equilibrium.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xinyi Hu
    • 1
    Email author
  • George Kesidis
    • 1
  • Behdad Heidarpour
    • 2
  • Zbigniew Dziong
    • 2
  1. 1.Pennsylvania State UniversityUniversity ParkUSA
  2. 2.École de technologie supérieure (ÉTS)MontrealCanada

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