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Early and Late Vision: Their Processes and Epistemic Status

  • Athanassios RaftopoulosEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

In this chapter, I elaborate my thesis that a stage of visual processing, namely, late vision, is Cognitively Penetrated (CP). The CP of late vision results in states with hybrid, that is visual/iconic and semantic/symbolic contents. The conceptual modulation of late vision notwithstanding, I argue that late vision is a perceptual stage rather than a stage of discursive thought. My main claim is that instead of discursive inferences, late vision involves pattern matching processes, and I discuss the perception of ambiguous figures to sybstantiate my claim. I also argue that early vision, too, does not involve discursive inferences and that both late and early vision involve some sort of abductive reasoning.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of CyprusNicosiaCyprus

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