The Cognitive Effects on Early and Late Vision and Their Epistemological Impact

  • Athanassios RaftopoulosEmail author
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)


In this chapter, I examine the repercussions of the cognitive impenetrability of early vision and cognitive penetrability of late vision for the epistemic role of visual perception and for the constructivist claim that our access to the world is mediated through our concepts.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of CyprusNicosiaCyprus

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