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Member State Interests and EU Internal Market Law

  • Mónika PappEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show to what degree Member States’ choices in pursuing their national interest is limited by EU internal market law. Additionally, the question is raised whether the EU legal framework is apt to accommodate measures emanating from diverse social, cultural and political settings at the national level. The present study seeks to improve our understanding of the capacity of the European Union to tackle particularistic Member State behaviour. It argues in line with other academics that the current extensive reach of internal market rules as developed by the Court of Justice should be rolled back in order to preserve more room for national public policy choices. On the other hand, the paper takes note of the fact that drawing a precise line between legitimate national policy measures and hidden regulatory or other protectionism is a difficult exercise.

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of LawBudapestHungary

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