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Vulnerability Assessment for PMU Communication Networks

  • Xiangyu Niu
  • Yue Tong
  • Jinyuan Sun
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11344)

Abstract

The smart grid is introducing many salient features such as wide-area situational awareness, precise demand response, substation automation. These features are enabled by data communication networks that facilitate the collection, transfer, and processing of a wide variety of data regarding different components of the smart grid. As a result, the smart grid’s heavy dependence on data inevitably poses a great challenge to ensure data integrity and authenticity. Even though with defending mechanisms like firewalls deployed, the internal network can no longer be deemed physically isolated. Additionally, the experience with information security in common computer network reveals that flawed designs, implementations, and configurations of the communication network introduce vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities open opportunities for attackers to launch cyber attackers. In this paper, we attempt to gain more insights with respect to the cyber security of the current PMU network technologies by exploring, validating, and demonstrating vulnerabilities.

Keywords

Vulnerability assessment Cyber security Smart grid 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical Enginnering and Computer ScienceUniversity of TennesseeKnoxvilleUSA
  2. 2.OSIsoftPhiladelphiaUSA

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