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Dual-Aspect Monism

  • Jiri Benovsky
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

In this chapter, I defend dual-aspect monism, and I examine it in detail. I claim that an ‘aspect’ is not a property, nor a higher-order property, and I show what role it plays in the understanding of the relationship between the mental and the physical. Close to Russellian monism, the variant of this view that I defend here claims that all entities are “phental”.

References

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of FribourgFribourgSwitzerland
  2. 2.University of NeuchâtelNeuchâtelSwitzerland

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