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The Mind-Body Problem, the Standard Failures of the Standard Solutions to It, and the Threat of Emergentism

  • Jiri Benovsky
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

This chapter provides indirect motivation for dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism by highlighting the places where more standard solutions to the mind-body problem fail. Emergentism is rejected, and well-known serious weaknesses of various types of physicalism and dualism are pointed out.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of FribourgFribourgSwitzerland
  2. 2.University of NeuchâtelNeuchâtelSwitzerland

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