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A Syncretistic View of Existence and Marty’s Relation to It

  • Alberto VoltoliniEmail author
Chapter
Part of the History of Analytic Philosophy book series (History of Analytic Philosophy)

Abstract

In this paper, I present, first, a syncretistic account of existence, which tries to show not only that the first-order and the second-order notions of existence are compatible, but also why we need all of them in order to properly understand what existence all in all amounts to. Second, I discuss to what extent Marty’s account of existence, which inter alia mobilizes Brentano’s attitudinal approach to it, can be legitimately considered to be a syncretistic account as well.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of TurinTurinItaly

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