A Dynamic Integrity Transitivity Model for the Cloud

  • Rongyu HeEmail author
  • Haonan Sun
  • Yong Zhang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11342)


Utilizing Trusted computing technology to enhance the security of Cloud has become a hot research, and a large number of solutions have been proposed in recent years. However, all of these solutions are focused on separating one Virtual Machine (VM) from others, and it is too strict for practical scenario as it forbids the communication between VMs. In this paper we propose a trust transitive model, named Dynamic Integrity Measurement Model (DIMM), for two VMs communication, and then an implementation of DIMM prototype is given. When dataflow occurs between two VMs, the DIMM will keep the trustworthiness of a system by ensuring the integrity of VMs and the delivered message. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of the model by experiments.


Cloud computing Trust chain Dynamic integrity TPM Virtualization 



This research was financially supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project 61572517) and the Science and Technology Plan Projects of Shenzhen (JCY2017302145623566).


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology InstituteZhengzhouChina
  2. 2.ATR Key Laboratory of National Defense TechnologyShenzhen UniversityShenzhenChina

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