Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Provisioning Non-obedient Resources Without Payment
Non-obedient nodes exist in some prevailing computing environments. They tend to pursue individual interests, provide resources strategically, and misreport private information. Strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness mechanisms in social choice are stimulate nodes to report their true private information so as to enable cooperation and participation. But they are rarely applied in computer science. Our work has introduced concepts from social choice into computer science to solve the incentive issue of node’s truth report about its private information, and get some meaningful results. First, we establish an environment of non-obedient resources, design a utility function without payment by considering nodes’ internal resource costs and feelings, and define node preference scheme which is single-peaked. Second, we design a mechanism for provisioning non-obedient resources based on the median voter scheme with (n − 1) phantom voters. This mechanism is strategy-proof and group strategy-proof when a node reports reduced value of its private information, while when it reports increased value, strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed but more resources are provided. Finally, experiments show the strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness characteristics of this mechanism.
KeywordsStrategy-proof mechanism Group strategy-proof mechanism Provisioning non-obedient resources Mechanism without payment Median voter scheme
This work was supported by the national natural science foundation of China (No. 41363003, No. 61502407), Study Abroad for Young Scholar Program sponsored by Guangdong University of Technology.
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