Kosova as a Chessboard: The Centrality of the Balance of Power
In this chapter I show how the balance of power was essential to the fateful decisions taken at key moments during this period filled with feverish diplomatic, military, and political activity on the side of great powers. The balance of power, through the balancing acts of the competitor state, forced NATO and the United States to go to a bombing campaign instead of going to the UN and through the UN, which was much more preferable. The balance of power limited and distorted the political objectives that were to be achieved. The balance of power made possible the ending of the bombing campaign. The balance of power determined, to a large extent, the essential political choices that were made and that were fateful to the future of ethnic conflict in Kosova. Ultimately, what started as a NATO bombing campaign, in complete disregard for the UN and other great powers, ended up as a negotiated solution between the United States and Russia, with Serbia protecting its sovereignty over Serbia proper, maintaining formal control over Kosova, and with Kosova itself transformed into a UN Mandate. A game that started without much regard for the traditional diplomacy ended up being played and concluded by the traditional rules of the balance of power.
- Agence France-Presse. “Russia Threatens to Veto UN Kosovo Resolution on Use of Force.” AFP, October 21, 1998.Google Scholar
- Balmasov, Sergej, and Vadim Trukhachev. “Russia’s Efforts to Save Yugoslavia from NATO Could Have Led to Nuclear War.” Pravda, March 24, 2009. http://english.pravda.ru/world/europe/24-03-2009/107289-yugoslavia-0/.
- Borovkin, Vladimir. “Discourse on NATO in Russia during the Kosovo War.” Demokratizatsiya 7, no. 4 (1999): 544–561.Google Scholar
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “NATO Must Stop Russia’s Power Play.” Wall Street Journal. Editorial Page, June 14, 1999.Google Scholar
- Cross, Sharyl. Russia and NATO Toward the 21st Century: Conflicts and Peace-Keeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Award Final Report NATO/Academic Affairs 1999–2001. Brussels, 2001.Google Scholar
- Felkay, Andrew. Yelsin’s Russia and the West. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.Google Scholar
- Henriksen, Dag. NATO’s Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–1999. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013.Google Scholar
- Hoffman, David. “Moscow Recalls NATO Delegate in Protest.” The Washington Post, March 25, 1999: A31.Google Scholar
- Independent International Commission on Kosovo. Kosovo Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.Google Scholar
- Judah, Tim. War and Revenge. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.Google Scholar
- Kissinger, Henry, and George Schultz. “Building on Common Ground with Russia.” The Washington Post, October 8, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/07/AR2008100702439.html.
- Krieger, Heike, ed. The Kosovo Conflict and the International Law, 1974–1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.Google Scholar
- Latawski, Paul, and Martin A. Smith. The Kosovo Crisis: The Evolution of Post Cold War European Security. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.Google Scholar
- Norris, John. Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005.Google Scholar
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFERL). Newsline, April 13, 1999. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1141883.html.
- Scott, Shirley V., Anthony John Billingsley, and Christopher Michaelsen. International Law and the Use of Force: A Documentary and Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009.Google Scholar
- Talbott, Strobe. The Russia Hand – A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy. New York: Random House, 2002.Google Scholar
- Zolotov, Andrej. “First Yugoslavia, Tomorrow Russia.” Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1999. http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0405/p9s2.html.