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Cognitive Structural Realism, the Nature of Cognitive Models, and some Further Clarifications

  • Majid Davoody Beni
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 14)

Abstract

This chapter concludes the enterprise of this book. It briefly overviews some of the themes that are unfolded in the book. For example, it highlights the unificatory vocation of CSR, as a theory which seeks to reconcile structural realism to the cognitive models of science approach. This chapter also clarifies the ontological commitments of CSR. It asserts that CSR makes ontological commitments to embodied informational structures. These informational structures could be identified in terms of information processing in the biological, cognitive systems. Owing to the embodied nature of these mechanisms and their reciprocal dynamical interactions with the environment, they could be assumed to be entwined with the causal structure of the world. Finally, the chapter offers a comprehensive entropy-based informational framework for comprising the informational structure of CSR.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Majid Davoody Beni
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management, Science, and TechnologyAmirkabir University of TechnologyTehranIran

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