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The Parting of the Ways

  • Majid Davoody Beni
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 14)

Abstract

This chapter unfolds the background of Cognitive Structural Realism (CSR) and its account of scientific representation. This overviews the pursuit of the idea of the underlying structure of scientific theories in the history of the philosophy of science and elaborates on some of the central themes of this book, e.g., unification, the underlying structure, and scientific representation. It also canvasses two blooming theories of the philosophy of science. These are structural realism and Cognitive Models of Science Approach. These two theories have usually been understood as rivals. But CSR emerges as a synthesis between these two theories. By being unified, structural realism and the cognitive models of science approach amend one another’s shortcomings.

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Authors and Affiliations

  • Majid Davoody Beni
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management, Science, and TechnologyAmirkabir University of TechnologyTehranIran

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