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Introduction, a Radically Naturalist Solution to the Problem of Scientific Representation

  • Majid Davoody Beni
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 14)

Abstract

The book aims to provide a radically naturalistic account of scientific representation in the field of philosophy of science and within the context of structural realism. The book’s account of scientific representation is presented within the context of a new (Cognitive) version of Structural Realism. This new theory, i.e., Cognitive Structural Realism (or CSR), is inspired by two rival approaches in the contemporary philosophy of science. These are (orthodox) Structural Realism and Cognitive Models of Science Approach. Also, CSR draws on resources of computational neuroscience, theoretical biology, as well as embodied and enactivist interpretations of theories of cognitive psychology, to provide a fresh theory of scientific representation and defend a naturalistically plausible and down-to-earth version of structural realism.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Majid Davoody Beni
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management, Science, and TechnologyAmirkabir University of TechnologyTehranIran

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