Authoritarian Power-Sharing under Collective Leadership and China’s Trade Policymaking

  • Hans H. TungEmail author
Part of the Politics and Development of Contemporary China book series (PDCC)


On the one hand, this chapter’s analysis of China’s trade policymaking processes helps us better envisage what actually happened within China’s opaque political system. On the other, it also provides circumstantial evidence for the two behavioral patterns of interest: bureaucratic activism and career incentives. The former is the major source of the dictator’s growth curse. As the “World of Bureaucratic Warcraft” case clearly illustrates, the perks created by the economic openness could drive the Chinese bureaucrats to exploit their current positions potentially at the expense of their future career prospects.

By contrast, the dynamic effect of the latter allows the dictator to tame the curse by dividing the elite and undermining their ability to overcome the collective action.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political Science/Center for Research in Econometric Theory and ApplicationsNational Taiwan UniversityTaipeiTaiwan

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