This chapter helps readers quickly understand the main argument of this book. It first lays bare what motivates this book, and then defines the key questions the entire book is centered around. The chapter also provides a synopsis of my argument, the literatures the book engages, the research design, and the plan of the book.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political Science/Center for Research in Econometric Theory and ApplicationsNational Taiwan UniversityTaipeiTaiwan

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