Rent Division Among Groups
In this paper, we extend the Rent Sharing problem to the case that every room must be allocated to a group of agents. In the classic Rent Sharing problem, there are n agents and a house with n rooms. The goal is to allocate one room to each agent and assign a rent to each room in a way that no agent envies any other option. Our setting deviates from the classic Rent Sharing problem in a sense that the rent charged to each room must be divided among the members of the resident group.
We define three notions to evaluate fairness, namely, weak envy-freeness, aggregate envy-freeness and strong envy-freeness. We also define three different policies to divide the cost among the group members, namely, equal, proportional, and free cost-sharing policies.
We present several positive and negative results for different combinations of the fairness criteria and rent-division policies. Specifically, when the groups are pre-determined, we propose a strong envy-free solution that allocates the rooms to the agents, with free cost-sharing policy. In addition, for the case that the groups are not pre-determined, we propose a strong envy-free allocation algorithm with equal cost-sharing policy. We leverage our results to obtain an algorithm that determines the maximum total rent along with the proper allocation and rent-division method.
KeywordsFairness Envy-freeness Rent sharing House allocation
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