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The Invisible Hand of the Market and Invincible Hand of the Raider

  • Ararat L. Osipian
Chapter

Abstract

The threat of predatory raiding has the potential to become the single most important source of additional transaction costs in Russia. This chapter clarifies whether predatory raiders in Russia can be considered as positive and useful market agents. This chapter also clarifies institutional aspects of raiding, by considering such issues as legitimacy of property rights and illegality of raiding. A periodically mentioned potential threat of renationalization that comes primarily from the state and voiced by different political groups keeps the legitimacy of property rights on both political and business agendas. Claims about property redistribution, dispersion, renationalization, or other possible actions in regard to property rights worry the business community. The Russian ruling political regime does not guarantee the stability of property rights and may serve the interests of predatory raiders.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ararat L. Osipian
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Wisconsin–MadisonMadisonUSA

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