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Mass Privatization: Virtual Reality, Volatile Rights, and Violent Raiding

  • Ararat L. Osipian
Chapter

Abstract

The phenomenon of predatory raiding cannot be considered without first looking into the earlier forms of property distribution, including Russia’s mass privatization. This chapter analyzes privatization reforms and crisis raiding. It starts with the mass privatization of the 1990s and argues that despite several attempts made by scholars, establishing the chronology of predatory raiding remains a challenge. If such a chronology is to be formed, it will inadvertently connect to stages of privatization as unequal distribution of property. This chapter argues that the predatory raiding of the 2000s and 2010s as a form of redistribution of property is certainly not the first wave of property redistribution that rolled over Russia. The mass privatization of the 1990s combined with corruption created perfect breeding grounds for predatory raiders.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ararat L. Osipian
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Wisconsin–MadisonMadisonUSA

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