Advertisement

Parasitism and Corporate Predation

  • Ararat L. Osipian
Chapter

Abstract

During Joseph Stalin era, the Soviet people were the objects of predation, the prey of the totalitarian regime. In addition to this major predator, there were parasites, most of which were petty and multiplied in millions, practicing embezzlement of socialist property, nepotism, cronyism, and gift-giving as a camouflaged bribery. It argues that despite the partial disintegration of the Soviet Union, the modern Russian state retains the role of the major predator. This one overwhelming predator helps predatory raiders to overpower—both legally and financially—a strong and successful business. This chapter argues that a profitable business can fall prey to a predatory raider only through the involvement or direct interference of an external force, an exogenous factor, or an overwhelming aggressive power such as that of the predatory state. Corrupt bureaucrats collude with predatory raiders, forming an unlawful symbiosis in order to expropriate profitable businesses and other valuable assets to their personal benefit.

References

  1. Abrams, N. (2014). Political Thugs: Criminal Corporate Raiding and Property Rights in Early-Capitalist Eastern Europe. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.Google Scholar
  2. Adachi, Y. (2010). Building Big Business in Russia: The Impact of Informal Corporate Governance Practices. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  3. Alexeev, M. (1988). Market vs. Rationing: The Case of Soviet Housing. Review of Economics and Statistics, 70(3), 414–420.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bernstam, M., & Rabushka, A. (2003). From Predation to Prosperity: Breaking UP Enterprise Network Socialism in Russia. Washington, DC: Hoover Institution.Google Scholar
  5. Birdsall, K. (2000). “Everyday Crime” at the Workplace: Covert Earning Schemes in Russia’s New Commercial Sector. In S. Lovell, A. Ledeneva, & A. Rogachevskii (Eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
  6. Duhamel, L. (2010). The KGB Campaign Against Corruption in Moscow, 1982–1987. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
  7. Feige, E. (1997). Underground Activity and Institutional Change: Productive, Protective, and Predatory Behavior in Transition Economies. In J. Nelson, C. Tilly, & L. Walker (Eds.), Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies (pp. 21–34). Washington, DC: National Academies Press.Google Scholar
  8. Firestone, T. (2010). Armed Injustice: Abuse of the Law and Complex Crime in Post-Soviet Russia. Denver International Law & Policy Review, 38(4), 555–580.Google Scholar
  9. Fitzpatrick, S., Rabinowitch, A., & Stites, R. (1991). Russia in the Era of NEP: Explorations in Soviet Society and Culture. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Glaz’ev, S. (1997). Genotsid: Rossiya i novyj mirovoj poryadok [Genocide: Russia and the New World Order]. Moscow: Erga.Google Scholar
  11. Goland, I. (1998). Krizisy, Razrushivshie NEP: Valiutnoe Regulirovanie v Period NEPa [Crises That Destructed NEP: Currency Regulation During NEP]. Moscow: Nachala.Google Scholar
  12. Karatuev, A. (1998). Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie osnovy gospodstva byurokratii v SSSR i v sovremennoj Rossii [Socio-Economic Foundations of Domination of Bureaucracy in the USSR and in Modern Russia]. Dissertation, DSc Economics, Volgograd, 08.00.01 Political Economy, 268 p. Retrieved July 22, 2012, from http://www.dissercat.com/content/sotsialno-ekonomicheskie-osnovy-gospodstva-byurokratii-v-sssr-i-v-sovremennoi-rossii
  13. Kireev, A. (2007). Raiding and the Market for Corporate Control: The Evolution of Strong-Arm Entrepreneurship. Problems of Economic Transition, 50(8), 29–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Kondrat’eva, T. S., & Sokolov, A. K. (Eds.). (2009). Rezhimnye lyudi v SSSR [Regime People in the USSR]. Moscow: ROSSPEN.Google Scholar
  15. Kornai, J. (1980). The Shortage Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland Press.Google Scholar
  16. Kudriavtsev, V. (1991). NEP: Vzgliad so Storony [NEP: View from Aside]. Moscow: Moskovsky Rabochy.Google Scholar
  17. Latov, Y. (2001). Ekonomika vne zakona: ocherki po teorii i istroii tenevoj ekonomiki [Economy Outlaw: Essays on Theory and History of the Shadow Economy]. Moscow: Moskovski obshchestvenny nauchny fond.Google Scholar
  18. Ledeneva, A. (2008a). Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 50(1), 118–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Ledeneva, A. (2008b). Telephone Justice in Russia. Post-Soviet Affairs, 24(4), 324–350.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Osipian, A. (2010). Corrupt Organizational Hierarchies in the Former Soviet Bloc. Transition Studies Review, 17(4), 822–836.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Pleines, H. (2000). Large-Scale Corruption and Rent-Seeking in the Russian Banking Sector. In S. Lovell, A. Ledeneva, & A. Rogachevskii (Eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
  22. Rivman, D. (2002). Kriminal’naya viktimologiya [Criminal Victimology]. Saint Petersburg: Piter.Google Scholar
  23. Rojansky, M. (2014). Corporate Raiding in Ukraine: Causes, Methods and Consequences. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 22(4), 411–443.Google Scholar
  24. Sakwa, R. (2011, December 5). Raiding in Russia. Russian Analytical Digest: State-Business Relations and Modernization (105), 9–13.Google Scholar
  25. Shlapentokh, V. (2007). Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society: A New Perspective on the Post-Soviet Era. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Shlapentokh, V., & Arutunyan, A. (2013). Freedom, Repression, and Private Property in Russia. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Simis, K. (1982). USSR: The Corrupt Society: The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism. New York: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar
  28. Social Darwinism. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved August 12, 2017, from https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-Darwinism
  29. Spiridonov, V. (2000). Attitudes to Bribery and Blat in Contemporary Russian Society: The Psychologist’s View. In S. Lovell, A. Ledeneva, & A. Rogachevskii (Eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
  30. Vaksberg, A. (1991). The Soviet Mafia. New York: St. Martin’s Press.Google Scholar
  31. Varchuk, T., & Vishnevetsky, K. (2002). Viktimologiya. Moscow: UNITY-DANA: Zakon i pravo.Google Scholar
  32. Voslensky, M. (1984). Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.Google Scholar
  33. Yakovlev, A. (2001). Sotsiologiya prestupnosti (kriminologiya): osnovy obshchej teorii. Moscow: Sodejstvie novy vek.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ararat L. Osipian
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Wisconsin–MadisonMadisonUSA

Personalised recommendations