How Different Versions of the Multiverse Interpretation Have Different Consequences for Free Will and Ontology: Developing the Concept of a Clustered-Minds Multiverse
Chapter 4, directly building up on the theoretical analysis in chapters 2 and 3, specifies the interpretation of the multiverse proposed in this book. Indeed, many scholars have pointed out that Everett’s original ‘many-worlds’ interpretation needs interpretation. Existing versions exhibit different problems. A principle problem of all of them materializes in connection with the probability rule of quantum mechanics: the Born (1926) rule; a problem that my proposal cannot solve either, but where I am suggesting a pragmatic handling. Most of them also have strange ontological consequences, most of them are not free-will friendly, most of them do not offer a satisfactory solution for the so-called preferred-basis problem, etc. Chapter 4 explains the problems that have been dealt with in the literature and then offers an interpretation of the multiverse without severe ontological problems that is also free-will friendly: the clustered-minds multiverse, where individuals’ consciousness will be allocated to different realities to a different extent. The concept will be spelled out in detail. The chapter also contains a box. This box deals with the question whether Menksy’s (2005, 2010) proposal of free will via an individual’s influence on subjective probabilities is theoretically acceptable.