5G Security: Concepts and Challenges

  • Poorna Pravallika Sriram
  • Hwang-Cheng Wang
  • Hema Ganesh Jami
  • Kathiravan Srinivasan


In the near future, the world will experience the 5G technology which is capable of offering many advanced features. As people get a deeper understanding of mobile communication, they also expect a higher level of privacy and security. Communication security involves the delivery of contents to the intended recipients while preventing the unauthorized access in an intelligible form by interceptors. The main objective of this chapter is to explain why security is fundamental to 5G and how it is different from 2G/3G/4G securities in relation to obligations, threats, and solutions. We also focus on physical layer security, which safeguards data confidentiality by exploiting the intrinsic randomness of the communications medium and reaping the benefits offered by the disruptive technologies of 5G. The standards and characteristics of 5G are also discussed in the chapter. The design architecture of the 5G network plan is included to address the challenges perceived. Based upon the experts’ knowledge, the roadmap to 5G is specified in the communication ecosystem. Security needs to be established to not only protect users from the existing threats but also address the rising and emerging threats. There are also many more existing concepts along with the security protocols to improve the resilience of 5G radio access networks. 5G security will have to take a quantum leap to meet the demands of modern society.


Evolution of cellular networks 5th generation Security Security models Security protocols 



Authentication and Key Agreement protocol


Advanced mobile telephone system


Artificial noise


Application programming interface


Antenna subset modulation


Broadcast channel with confidential message


Bit error rate


Base station


Bring your own device


Cognitive radio


Domain Name System


Degrees of Freedom


Edge Automation Platform


Enhanced Mobile Broadband


Evolved Packet System


European Telecommunications Standards Institute


European Telecommunications Standards Institute


Frequency Division Duplex


Frequency Division Multiple Access


High Definition


Host Identity Protocol


Hypertext Transfer Protocol


International Electro-technical Commission


Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers


Internet Engineering Task Force


International Mobile Subscriber Identity


International Mobile Telecommunication


Improved Mobile Telephone System


Internet Protocol


Internet Protocol version 4


Internet Protocol version 6


Internet Protocol Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment


International Organization for Standardization


International Telecommunication Union




Low-density parity check


Long-Term Evolution


Machine to machine


Multiple access wiretap channel


Multiple input, multiple output


Millimeter Wave


Mobile Platform Work Group


Mobile telephone system


North American Electric Reliability Corporation


Non-orthogonal multiple access


Network planning


Open Networking Foundation


Push to talk


Quality of service


Radio access network


Relay stations


Standards Development Organization


Software-defined radio


Self-interference cancellation


Signal-to-interference-noise ratio


Trusted Computing Group


Transmission Control Protocol


Time division duplex


Unmanned aerial vehicle


Universal Subscriber Identity Module


Working group


Zero-forcing beam-forming


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Poorna Pravallika Sriram
    • 1
  • Hwang-Cheng Wang
    • 2
  • Hema Ganesh Jami
    • 3
  • Kathiravan Srinivasan
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Electronics & Communication EngineeringVel Tech Rangarajan Dr. Sagunthala R&D Institute of Science and TechnologyChennaiIndia
  2. 2.Department of Electronic EngineeringNational Ilan University (NIU)Yilan CityTaiwan
  3. 3.Vel Tech Rangarajan Dr. Sagunthala R&D Insititute of Science and TechnologyChennaiIndia
  4. 4.School of Information Technology and Engineering, Vellore Institute of Technology (VIT)VelloreIndia

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