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Overcoming Armed Conflict in Crimilegal Orders

  • Markus Schultze-Kraft
Chapter

Abstract

Crimilegal orders are not always and only violence-inflected but also display a capacity to overcome armed conflict by means of crimilegal bargaining and negotiations. This is not recognised in conventional analyses of peacemaking and peacebuilding, which focus on how organised criminal activities and structures either trigger and drive armed conflicts or spoil peace operations. The capacity of crimilegal orders to overcome or suspend violent conflict is illustrated in relation to the recent peace process between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the amnesty and post-amnesty programme brokered between the federal government of Nigeria and the Niger Delta militants.

Keywords

Crimilegal order Armed conflict Armed conflict termination Peacemaking Colombia Nigeria 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Markus Schultze-Kraft
    • 1
  1. 1.Universidad IcesiCaliColombia

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