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Governance and Violence in Crimilegal Orders

  • Markus Schultze-Kraft
Chapter

Abstract

In crimilegal orders, the state does not command a monopoly over the use of violence and coercion. Instead, there are several violence oligopolists, including the state or sectors of it and armed non-state groups, who, in the exercise of political authority and the pursuit of particularistic goals, cooperate and compete with one another. Thus, in such settings the exercise of political authority, that is governance, is not exclusively inflected by state coercion but also by the violence capability commanded by diverse non-state actors. However, crimilegal governance is not always associated with violence and coercion, but public revenue and goods may also be appropriated without the use of force. This is illustrated in relation to land grabbing in Colombia and fuel subsidy scamming and oil theft in Nigeria.

Keywords

Crimilegal governance Oligopolies of violence and coercion Political settlements Colombia Nigeria 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Markus Schultze-Kraft
    • 1
  1. 1.Universidad IcesiCaliColombia

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