Overview of Global Coordination on Bio-Nonproliferation and Its Limits

  • Maria Hecht
  • Stefan KlothEmail author
  • Min-Hi Lee


More than ever, infectious diseases are an issue of international importance. However, related research, increasing knowledge and technologies often bear dual-use aspects as an immanent risk of misuse, e.g. for development and proliferation of biological weapons. In this chapter, relevant programmes, regulations and binding international agreements are introduced to give an overview of activities concerning bio-nonproliferation.


Nonproliferation Biosafety Biosecurity Public health Global health Dual use 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Strengthening Global Health and BiosecurityRobert Koch InstituteBerlinGermany
  2. 2.Federal Information Centre for Biological Threats and Special Pathogens (IBBS)Robert Koch InstituteBerlinGermany

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