Synthetic Biology: Biosecurity and Biosafety Implications
Synthetic biology and other advanced biotechnologies hold a great deal of promise for medicine, public health, manufacturing, and national economies, but they also have biosafety and biosecurity implications. Using synthetic biology techniques, it is possible for a nefarious actor to acquire a viral pathogen made with chemically synthesized pieces, versus having to acquire samples of pathogens from an environmental source or from another laboratory. It is also possible to test many parallel approaches for designing new functions into existing pathogens, given that the costs of DNA synthesis continue to drop; this has dual-use implications for biodefense. These biosecurity concerns do not replace the existent challenges prior to the advent of synthetic biology but add to them, as early non-synthetic biology paths to biological weapons development are still able to be used to make biological weapons. In addition to biosecurity concerns, there are biosafety implications of synthetic biology, as the techniques are powerful, they may be used outside of traditional biocontainment, and because relative newcomers to biological containment are entering the field.
KeywordsSynthetic biology Biosafety Dual-use research of concern Biosecurity
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