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Historical Aspects of Biological Weapons Development and Use

  • Gregory D. KoblentzEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter presents the most recent scholarship on the most important periods in the history of biological warfare. Historically, state-based biological warfare programs have been viewed as posing the only biological threat to international security. More recently, non-state actors such as terrorists and criminals have also demonstrated an interest in acquiring and using biological agents as weapons. This chapter provides an overview of the long and complicated history of the development and use of biological weapons with an emphasis on the key state-based programs and terrorist groups that have invested the most effort in acquiring and using biological weapons.

Keywords

Bioweapon history Bioterrorism Biological warfare Use of biological weapons 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Schar School of Policy and GovernmentGeorge Mason UniversityArlingtonUSA

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