Disoriented No More: An Economics Compass for the EU’s Cost Orientation Principle

  • Henrik Ballebye Okholm
  • Mindaugas Cerpickis
  • Bruno BasaliscoEmail author
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP)


Postal incumbents across the world are often subject to price-cost rules. The motivation for our paper is the discussion within the EU and elsewhere of this relationship, against a backdrop of a somewhat ambiguous framework and uncertain and diverging implementation of regulatory price-cost tests.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Henrik Ballebye Okholm
    • 1
  • Mindaugas Cerpickis
    • 1
  • Bruno Basalisco
    • 1
    Email author
  1. 1.Copenhagen EconomicsCopenhagenDenmark

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