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Understanding the Behaviors of BGP-based DDoS Protection Services

  • Tony Miu Tung
  • Chenxu WangEmail author
  • Jinhe Wang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11058)

Abstract

Distributed Denial of Service attacks has been one of the most challenges faced by the Internet for decades. Recently, DDoS protection services (DPS) have risen up to mitigate large-scale DDoS attacks by diverting the vast malicious traffic against the victims to affordable networks. One common approach is to reroute the traffic through the change of BGP policies, which may cause abnormal BGP routing dynamics. However, little is known about such behaviors and the consequences. To fill this gap, in this paper, we conduct the first study on the behaviors of BGP-based DPS through two steps. First, we propose a machine learning based approach to identify DDoS events because there usually lacks data for characterizing real DDoS events. Second, We design a new algorithm to analyze the behavior of DPS against typical DDoS attacks. In the case study of real DDoS attacks, we carefully analyze the policies used to mitigate the attacks and obtain several meaningful findings. This research sheds light on the design of effective DDoS attack mitigation schemes.

Keywords

DDoS attacks BGP traffic DPS behavior 

Notes

Acknowledgment

The research presented in this paper is supported in part by National Natural Science Foundation (No. 61602370, 61672026, 61772411, U1736205), Postdoctoral Foundation (No. 201659M2806, 2018T111066), Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 1191320006), Shaanxi Postdoctoral Foundation, Project JCYJ20170816100819428 supported by SZSTI, CCF-Tencent Open Fund WeBank Special Funding (No. CCF-Webank RAGR20180101), CCF-NSFOCUS KunPeng Research Fund (No. CCF-NSFOCUS 2018006).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Nexusguard Ltd.Tsuen WanHong Kong
  2. 2.School of Software EngineeringXi’an Jiaotong UniversityXi’anChina
  3. 3.MoE Key Laboratory for INNSXi’an Jiaotong UniversityXi’anChina

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