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The Analytic Framework: Modeling the Dilemma of Transboundary River Basins as an Iterated PD Game

  • Mina Michel Samaan
Chapter

Abstract

One way of analyzing different forms of managing freshwater is to consider it an economic good (Menzel 2014). This is because it passes along its lifecycle through a group of economic processes: collection, production, drainage, sanitation, treatment and reuse. These processes require a set of policies that define priorities of supplies, regulate pricing, and control expected impacts on society and environment. Cornes and Sandler (1986) classified economic goods into four groups, based on the factors of “exclusion” and “rivalry”: private, public, club and common goods (Table 2.1). The factor of “exclusion” refers to who can get the service, while “rivalry” indicates how the usage of someone affects the ability of others to use the service. According to this classification, freshwater can take one of those four forms: a bottle of water in supermarket (private); water pipelines constructed by public authorities to supply houses (public); a well in the desert drilled by a tribe (club); or rivers and lakes (common). The most complicated problems are related to the fourth type, since leaving common water resources unregulated and unmanaged, regarded as the “gift of nature,” entails severe threats to both the resources and communities dependent on them. In contrast, each of the other types usually has solid mechanisms of regulation and control, even if with different levels of effectiveness and efficiency.

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Authors and Affiliations

  • Mina Michel Samaan
    • 1
  1. 1.Braunschweig University of TechnologyBraunschweigGermany

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