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Dynamic Bayesian Games for Adversarial and Defensive Cyber Deception

  • Ehab Al-Shaer
  • Jinpeng Wei
  • Kevin W. Hamlen
  • Cliff Wang
Chapter

Abstract

Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive, and strategic. Attack instances such as Stuxnet, Dyn, and WannaCry ransomware have shown the insufficiency of off-the-shelf defensive methods including the firewall and intrusion detection systems. Hence, it is essential to design up-to-date security mechanisms that can mitigate the risks despite the successful infiltration and the strategic response of sophisticated attackers.

In this chapter, we use game theory to model competitive interactions between defenders and attackers. First, we use the static Bayesian game to capture the stealthy and deceptive characteristics of the attacker. A random variable called the type characterizes users’ essences and objectives, e.g., a legitimate user or an attacker. The realization of the user’s type is private information due to the cyber deception. Then, we extend the one-shot simultaneous interaction into the one-shot interaction with asymmetric information structure, i.e., the signaling game. Finally, we investigate the multi-stage transition under a case study of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and Tennessee Eastman (TE) process. Two-sided incomplete information is introduced because the defender can adopt defensive deception techniques such as honeyfiles and honeypots to create sufficient amount of uncertainties for the attacker. Throughout this chapter, the analysis of the Nash equilibrium (NE), Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), and perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) enables the policy prediction of the adversary and the design of proactive and strategic defenses to deter attackers and mitigate losses.

Keywords

Bayesian games Multi-stage transitions Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) Cyber deception Proactive and strategic defense 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ehab Al-Shaer
    • 1
  • Jinpeng Wei
    • 2
  • Kevin W. Hamlen
    • 3
  • Cliff Wang
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Software & Information SystemUniversity of North Carolina CharlotteCharlotteUSA
  2. 2.Department of Software and Information SystemUniversity of North CarolinaCharlotteUSA
  3. 3.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of Texas at DallasRichardsonUSA
  4. 4.Computing and Information Science DivisionArmy Research OfficeDurhamUSA

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