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The Ends of Your Means

  • Darren Grant
Chapter
Part of the Springer Texts in Business and Economics book series (STBE)

Abstract

This chapter lays out the first steps to bringing closure to an empirical study. Above all, this involves pursuing “coherence,” in which the study’s findings, economic theory, and vernacular knowledge about the phenomenon of interest coalesce into a logically consistent, unified whole. The pursuit of coherence is multifaceted, and extends to the larger literature to which the study belongs. These ideas inform studies of the demand for cigarettes, zero tolerance drunk driving laws, The Great Moderation, and more.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Darren Grant
    • 1
  1. 1.Sam Houston State UniversityHuntsvilleUSA

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