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Two Prediction Methods for Intention-Aware Online Routing Games

  • László Z. Varga
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10767)

Abstract

Intention-aware prediction is regarded as an important agreement technology to help large amount of agents in aligning their activities towards an equilibrium. If the agents do not align their activities in online routing games, then the multi-agent system is not guaranteed to get to a stable equilibrium. We formally define two intention-aware prediction methods for online routing games and empirically evaluate them in a real-world scenario. The experiments confirm that the defined intention-aware routing strategies limit the fluctuation in this online routing game scenario and make the system more or less converge to the equilibrium.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of InformaticsELTE Eötvös Loránd UniversityBudapestHungary

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