On Cooperative Connection Situations Where the Players Are Located at the Edges

  • Stefano MorettiEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10767)


In classical cooperative connection situations, the agents are located at some nodes of a network and the cost of a coalition is based on the problem of finding a network of minimum cost connecting all the members of the coalition to a source.

In this paper we study a different connection situation with no source and where the agents are the edges, and yet the optimal network associated to each coalition (of edges) is not fixed and follows a cost-optimization procedure. The proposed model shares some similarities with classical minimum cost spanning tree games, but also substantial differences, specifically on the appropriate way to share the costs among the agents located at the edges. We show that the core of these particular cooperative games is always non-empty and some core allocations can be easily computed.


Coalitional games Connection situations Cost allocation protocols Core 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS, UMR [7243]ParisFrance

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