Multiagent Resource Allocation: The Power and Limitations of Bilateral Deals (Extended Abstract)

  • Nicolas MaudetEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10767)


This is a companion extended abstract to the invited talk given at EUMAS-2017. The talk was mostly based on [3, 4].


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Copyright information

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sorbonne Université, CNRS, Laboratoire d’Informatique de Paris 6, LIP6ParisFrance

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